Abstract: In 1970, several tribes in the Pacific Northwest, along with their federal trustee, sued the state of Washington claiming that numerous state actions violated their treaty rights, which assured them "the right of taking fish in common with" white settlers. The tribes and their federal trustee maintained that the treaties of the 1850s guaranteed the tribes: (1) a share of fish harvests for subsistence, cultural, and commercial purposes; (2) inclusion of hatchery fish in that harvest share; and (3) protection of the habitat necessary for the salmon that were the basis of the treaty bargain and the peaceful white settlement of the Pacific Northwest. By 1985, the tribes and the trustee persuaded the courts of the merits of the first two propositions, but the Ninth Circuit deferred on the third issue, declining to declare that the treaties supplied habitat protection in the absence of a specific factual dispute.
INTRODUCTION
One hundred sixty years ago, during treaty negotiations that led Indian tribes to cede some 64 million acres to the federal government and ensure the largely peaceful settlement of the Pacific Northwest, the principal federal negotiator, Governor Isaac Ingalls Stevens, stated, "I want that you shall not have simply food and drink now but that you may have them forever." 1 Later, he announced, "This paper is such as a man would give to his children and I will tell you why. This paper gives you a home. Does not a father give his children a home? . . . This paper secures your fish. Does not a father give food to his children?" 2 The full meaning of those promises has been the subject of almost continuous litigation for over 130 The latest round of litigation began in 2001, when the federal government and twenty-one tribes sued the State of Washington over its construction and maintenance of road culverts, 5 which migrating fish like salmon use to pass highways and other roads. In 2007, United States District Court Judge Ricardo Martinez ruled that the state's culverts violated the treaty right by "affirmatively diminish[ing] the number of fish available for harvest," even though the tribes could not give exact figures on the number of fish lost. 6 In reaching his decision, Judge Martinez relied on well-established rules of treaty interpretation favoring the tribes, 7 mindful of the fact that the consideration for the immense amount of land the tribes ceded in the treaties was largely the "right of taking fish," coupled with assurances from federal negotiators that the United States would protect that right. [I]t is accordingly inconceivable that either party deliberately agreed to authorize future settlers to crowd the Indians out of any meaningful use of their accustomed places to fish. That each individual Indian would share an 'equal opportunity' with thousands of newly arrived individual settlers is totally foreign to the spirit of the negotiations. Such a 'right,' along with the $207,500 paid the Indians, would hardly have been sufficient to compensate them for the millions of acres they ceded to the Territory. Id. See also infra notes 73, 81, 137 and accompanying text.
9. The real issue was how quickly the state would repair its culverts, since it committed do so under state law, but its pace was extremely slow with no deadlines for finishing. See infra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
Consequently, the case went to trial in 2009 and 2010. In 2013, the judge issued an injunction establishing schedules for the state to fix the culverts. 10 The state appealed, claiming that the judge's injunction would cost the state some $2.4 billion.
11
In 2016-nine years after Judge Martinez's initial decision and fortysix years after the tribes filed suit seeking habitat protection 12 -the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Judge William Fletcher, writing for a unanimous panel, relied heavily on foundational Indian law interpretative principles and upheld the lower court's injunction in all respects. 13 The result represented a thorough victory for the tribes and their federal trustee and a considerable setback for the state, which was unable even to win so much as a modification of Judge Martinez's injunction. Assuming the decision is not overturned on appeal, the result vindicated the tribes' efforts of nearly a half-century of litigation to obtain judicial recognition that their treaties entitled them to: (1) a share of fish harvests, especially salmon; (2) inclusion of hatchery fish in that harvest share; and (3) protection for the environment necessary to preserve the fish.
14 All of these claims have now succeeded, albeit only after long and tortuous litigation. 13. Washington, 827 F.3d at 850 (relying on foundational principles of treaty interpretation such as " [t] he language used in treaties with the Indians should never be construed to their prejudice") (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 582 (1832)); id. at 865 (affirming the district court's decision to enjoin Washington to correct barrier culverts in accordance with the treaties). See also infra note 35 and accompanying text.
14. See id. at 845-46 (discussing the initial case, filed in 1970, and agreeing that the treaties entitled the tribes to a share of fish harvest); id. at 846 (discussing earlier proceedings affirming that hatchery fish must be included in determining the share of salmon for the tribes): id. at 853 (agreeing with the district court that Washington has a duty to protect the environment in order to guarantee the tribes' share of fish under the treaties).
This Article explains the Ninth Circuit's culverts decision and its implications for the future. Part I sets the stage by briefly describing the context in which the nearly half-century old case began, including the State of Washington's long and shameful efforts to preempt tribal fisheries and the Supreme Court's many interpretations of the Stevens Treaty language. Part II turns to the litigation that led up to the Martinez Decision, the so-called Boldt Decision 15 and its affirmance by the Supreme Court. Part III considers the case law following the Boldt Decision, which confirmed that hatchery fish were included in the tribal allocation but inconclusively resolved the habitat issue when the Ninth Circuit declared in 1985 that the question was too vague to decide in the abstract.
Part IV then turns to the Martinez Decision in both its declaratory and injunctive relief phases. Part V examines the Ninth Circuit's resounding affirmance of Judge Martinez's decision, based in large measure on foundational canons of treaty interpretation. Part VI looks beyond the Ninth Circuit's decision, to assess its implications outside the State of Washington's road culverts, including consideration of federal and local road culverts as well as other habitat-damaging activities like timber harvesting, dam operations, and land use practices. The Article concludes that the case reflects the federal trust relationship with Indian tribes at its best, as the tribes and the federal trustee worked together since 1970 to procure meaningful treaty fishing rights. Moreover, while eliminating barrier culverts will significantly improve the fish habitat in the Puget Sound basin, the decision's implications beyond Washington and beyond state-owned road culverts portend significant future changes in land and water-use management in the Northwest. The culverts case could, for example, cause both the states and the federal government to consult with tribes concerning development projects potentially affecting treaty rights. Such consultation could avoid litigation over other habitatdamaging proposals in the future.
I. THE STATE OF WASHINGTON'S HISTORIC PREEMPTION OF TRIBAL FISHING AND THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY "RIGHT OF TAKING FISH"
Soon after the treaties of the 1850s, the white settlers in the Pacific Northwest began to physically preempt tribal fishers by securing locational advantages on rivers, estuaries, and in Puget Sound and the 15 ocean. 16 This physical preemption was soon followed by legal measures that sanctioned this preemption. 17 The federal courts, however, soon weighed in with path-breaking interpretations of the treaties as recognizing tribal property rights-interpretations ratified by the United States Supreme Court-that foreclosed complete preemption of tribal fisheries. 18 This Part discusses these developments.
A. The Salmon Fishery and State Preemption
The negotiations that led to what are now known as the Stevens Treaties made clear that both the tribes and the federal representatives intended to protect and preserve the tribes' ability to fish in order to sustain themselves and their way of life.
19 All the treaties contained similar language, recognizing the tribal "right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds . . . in common with" white settlers. 20 Although the treaties did not expressly mention salmonids, they were the central focus of the negotiations, as salmon were essential to tribal economic and cultural practices which the tribes bargained to retain. 21 Salmon are easy to harvest, given their homing instinct; the Supreme Court even analogized salmon harvests to agricultural crops. 22 Thus, achieving a locational advantage along the migratory route of salmon runs is critical when competition among harvesters becomes intense. 16 . See Winans Centennial, supra note 3, at 507-09 (describing commercial fishing at the mouth of the Columbia River and the use of fish wheels preempting upriver tribal harvests).
17. See id. at 509-10 (discussing state designations of "salmon preserves," restrictions on net sizes, and seasonal closures that disadvantaged tribal fishing); infra note 24.
18 21. According to the Ninth Circuit, "salmon were a central concern" of the treaty negotiations. Id. at 851 (citing historian Richard White of Stanford). The government intended that tribal fishers would supply the settlers with food as a result of their salmon harvests, and thus become an integral part of the pioneer economy. See SACRIFICING SALMON, supra note 12, at 5, 61-63.
22. Washington v. Commercial Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 663 (1979) (analogizing the salmon runs to agricultural crops due to the relative predictability of harvests).
During the late nineteenth century, non-tribal fishers secured locational advantages in the Columbia River and Puget Sound basins by shifting fishing efforts downriver and into the bays, estuaries, and ocean. They thus could harvest salmon before the salmon reached a tribe's upriver usual and accustomed fishing grounds, thereby physically preempting treaty-recognized fisheries. These efforts were aided by technological innovations such as gasoline-powered ocean troll boats and refrigerated railroad cars that delivered fresh salmon to distant markets like San Francisco, New York, and even Japan. 23 Moreover, the state intervened to aid non-tribal fisheries by outlawing net fishing where the only net fishing was by tribal members. 24 Washington courts were quite complicit in this effort to legally preempt tribal fisheries, as they repeatedly affirmed the state's authority to regulate the fishery by disadvantaging tribal fishers. 25 And they did so in overtly racist language. Consider the following statement from the Washington State Supreme Court's 1916 decision of State v. Towessnute 26 in which the court, after declaring a Stevens Treaty to be a "dubious document" and expressly rejecting the "premise of Indian sovereignty," asserted that "the aborigines" had only the rights of "mere occupants."
27 This physical and legal preemption took place despite a considerable body of federal case law that began in the territorial courts and suggested that this preemption was illegal.
B. The Early Cases
The first recorded treaty fishing rights case occurred in 1884, when Frank Taylor purchased a homestead adjacent to Celilo Falls, and then leased the land to an Indian, William Spedis, who proceeded to deny Fish wheels were water-powered devices used for catching salmon that were so effective in harvesting fish that they were banned on the Columbia River in the early twentieth century. They were revolving wheels with baskets and paddles attached to their rims that use the river current to turn the wheel and lift migrating salmon out of the river. When the wheel floated on the river, the river current turned the wheel, causing the baskets to scoop down upon the salmon traveling upstream and lift them out of the water. 38 Consequently, the Court enjoined Taylor and his successors from interfering with Indian "ancient" fishing practices that had been used "for generations" and recognized in the treaty language. 39 The United States Supreme Court would invoke the principles used by Judge Hoyt over the next century.
C. The Supreme Court's Decisions
During the twentieth century, conflicts between tribal and white fishermen caused the United States Supreme Court to interpret the treaty "right of taking fish" seven times. 40 The Court employed the canons of treaty interpretation 41 and, almost invariably, broadly interpreted the nature of the rights the tribes reserved in the 1850s treaties. decision as (1) ratifying the rule that treaties would be construed as the tribes would understand; (2) establishing the reserved rights doctrine; (3) considering treaty rights to establish property rights; and (4) rejecting the state's "equal footing" argument).
44. "The right to resort to the fishing places in controversy was part of larger rights possessed by the Indians, upon the exercise of which there was not a shadow of impediment, and which were not [Vol. 92:1
[W]e have said we will construe a treaty with the Indians as 'that unlettered people' understood it, and 'as justice and reason demand, in all cases where power is exerted by the strong over those to whom they owe care and protection,' and counterpoise the inequality 'by the superior justice which looks only to the substance of the right, without regard to technical rules.' 45 Like the Taylor court, the Supreme Court interpreted the treaty fishing right to impress an easement on private lands, enabling tribal fisherman to access their reserved fishing grounds. 46 But while reading the treaty language to provide tribal fishers a property right to access historic fishing grounds, the Court also announced that the state was not restrained, "if at all," from regulating the fishery. 47 This dictum emboldened the state to use its police power during the first threequarters of the twentieth century to consistently disadvantage tribal fishers.
48
Soon after its historic 1905 decision, the Court expanded the nature of the tribal reserved right to extend to lands not expressly ceded by the treaties, ruling that Yakama fishers' treaty rights extended to the Oregon side of the Columbia River. 49 Later, in 1942, the Court declared that the treaties protected tribal members fishing at historic sites from state licensing fees. 50 Thus, the Court added fiscal preemption to the proscribed physical preemption of its earlier decisions.
In a series of decisions concerning the state's regulation of salmon fishing on the Puyallup River, the Court first decided that the treaties allowed the state to regulate tribal fishing in the interest of conservation of the fish, so long as the regulation was non-discriminatory and met much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they breathed. 51 But when the state decided to employ this "conservation necessity" authority to ban all net fishing on the river, the Court quickly was forced to clarify that such a ban-which affected only tribal fishers-was proscribed because it was discriminatory in effect, even though it was not facially discriminatory. 52 The state's definition of conservation was overbroad, as it sought to "conserve" salmon for nontribal fishers. 53 Perhaps recognizing the state's persistent regulatory bias, the Court called for "fairly apportioned" harvests between tribal and non-tribal fishers. 54 Lower courts were already grappling with devising such an allocation to safeguard the treaty fishing right.
II. THE BOLDT DECISION AND ITS AFTERMATH
In the 1960s, Oregon and Washington routinely arrested tribal members for fishing in violation of state conservation regulations. 55 In one such case, Judge Robert Belloni of the United States District Court for the District of Oregon rejected the State of Oregon's argument that the treaties gave the tribes only an equal opportunity to fish with others, 54. Puyallup II, 414 U.S. at 48-49. The Supreme Court was unable to extricate itself from the Puyallup controversy without issuing a third opinion, after the Ninth Circuit ruled that the tribal fishing at issue was actually on-reservation, not-as the Supreme Court had assumed-offreservation, because the appeals court ruled that the Puyallup reservation had not been extinguished. Fearing that an exclusive on-reservation right would allow tribal fishermen to "interdict completely the migrating fish run and 'pursue the last living [Puyallup River] steelhead,'" the Court affirmed a state court's allocation of forty-five percent of steelhead harvests to the tribe. Dep 58 Belloni ruled that the tribes were entitled to a "fair share" of the harvests, 59 although he did not define what precisely those terms meant. 60 In a similar case, involving Puget Sound fisheries, Judge George Boldt would soon do so.
Following the Belloni Decision, tribal members continued to be arrested for off-reservation fishing, especially in Puget Sound. 61 The tribes and the federal government filed suit in 1970, claiming that the treaty fishing promise assured them: (1) a fair allocation of harvests; (2) inclusion of hatchery fish in that allocation; and (3) protection of the environment and habitat necessary to provide meaningful subsistence and commercial harvests.
62 Judge Boldt heard evidence for some three years on the first issue, while deferring consideration of the latter two issues.
Invoking the canons of treaty interpretation, Boldt decided that the state's regulatory scheme systematically discriminated against the tribal fishing right by closing historic fishing sites to net fishing to the extent that at the time of trial the tribes were harvesting only about two percent 56. Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 910-11 (D. Or. 1969). 57. See SACRIFICING SALMON, supra note 12, at 79. 58. Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. at 905 (responding to the state's equal opportunity argument, the court stated, "Such a reading would not seem unreasonable if all history, anthropology, biology, prior case law and the intention of the parties to the treaties were to be ignored.").
59. Id. at 911. 60. Judge Belloni did order the state to adopt an objective of treating the tribal fishery "co-equal with the conservation of fish runs for other users." Id. He later established detailed standards and procedures for the state to follow in producing this co-equal status, including: (1) enabling the tribes to "participate meaningfully" in the development of harvest regulations, and (2) requiring such regulations to be "the least restrictive which can be imposed [ of the salmon. 63 Consequently, echoing Judge Belloni, Judge Boldt determined that the treaty "right of taking fish" required a fair allocation of harvests; however, he proceeded to define the treaty language "in common with" to mean a property right to half of the harvests. 64 He therefore directed the state to limit non-treaty fishing to meet this treaty obligation.
65
Although Judge Boldt's decision was a judicial landmark, implementing the court's decree became problematic, as the decision generated widespread public outrage and state resistance. 66 This recalcitrance prompted the Ninth Circuit, in affirming the decision, to remark that "[e]xcept for some desegregation cases, the district court has faced the most concerted official and private efforts to frustrate a decree of a federal court witnessed in this century." 67 The state exacerbated the situation by claiming that it lacked authority to implement the injunction, and the Washington State Supreme Court agreed. 68 The upshot was that Judge Boldt had to issue numerous orders managing the fish harvests for several years.
69 Perhaps influenced by the state's intransigence in implementing a federal court decree that had been twice affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, 70 the United States Supreme Court agreed to interpret the meaning of the "right of taking" once again, for the fourth time in eleven years. 63 . Id. at 393 (noting that the state had closed many historic tribal fishing sites to net fishing while "permitting commercial [non-Indian] net fishing for salmon elsewhere on the same runs of fish"). See also Washington v. Commercial Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 676-77 n.22 (1979) (two percent of harvests).
64. Boldt Decision, 384 F. Supp. at 343 (construing "in common with" to mean "[b]y dictionary definition and as intended and used in the . . . treaties [,] . . . sharing equally the opportunity to take fish"). Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, applied the canons of treaty interpretation 72 and construed the treaty fishing right language to preserve for the tribes a supply of fish-not merely an opportunity to fish. He cited Governor Stevens' specific promise that the salmon would provide a continuous "source of food and commerce." 73 According to the Court, the treaties prevented the state from "crowd[ing] the Indians out" of the tribal fishery and guaranteed the tribes a fishing livelihood, up to fifty percent of the harvests. 74 The Court's affirmation of Judge Boldt on the harvest share issue 75 did not, however, resolve the other two issues before the district court: (1) whether hatchery fish were included within the tribes' allocated share; and (2) he central principle here must be that Indian treaty rights to a natural resource that once was thoroughly and exclusively exploited by the Indians secures so much as, but not more than, is necessary to provide the Indians with a livelihood-that is, to say, a moderate living."); id. at 687 n.27 ("The logic of the 50% ceiling is manifest. For an equal divisionespecially between parties who presumptively treated with each other as equals-is suggested, if not necessarily dictated, by the word 'common' as it appears in the treaties. Since the days of Solomon, such a division has been accepted as a fair apportionment of a common asset . . . ."). The Court opined that the "moderate living" standard would allow a judicial reduction below 50% if a tribe: (1) dwindled to just a few members; or (2) abandoned its fisheries. Id. at 687. No evidence of either condition has appeared since the Court's 1979 opinion. On the significance of the insertion of the moderate living language by Justice Stevens, see Resounding Reaffirmation, supra note 5, at 672 n.100 (explaining that Justice Marshall's papers suggested that Justice Stevens thought the language was necessary to preserve the six-member majority).
75. The Supreme Court made two modifications to Judge Boldt's decision: (1) including onreservation harvests as well as off-reservations harvests in the tribal share; and (2) 
III. BEYOND THE BOLDT DECISION: THE HATCHERY AND HABITAT ISSUES
The courts resolved the hatchery fish issue rather quickly. The district judge who succeeded Judge Boldt, Judge William Orrick, 77 ruled that the hatchery fish were included within the tribes' allocation because the tribes reserved not merely a share of treaty-time harvests but also a share of future fish runs. Judge Orrick also stated that hatchery fish had become the overwhelming mitigation choice for spawning fish damaged by development activities like dam construction and operation. 78 . Judge Orrick noted that the Supreme Court in affirming Judge Boldt found that the primary purpose of the treaty fishing right was to preserve the tribes' economic and cultural way of life, and that federal negotiators "specifically assured the tribes that they could continue to fish notwithstanding the changes that the impending western expansion would certainly entail." Id. at 204. [Vol. 92:1 tribes with empty-net fishing, which the Court had also proscribed. 82 Therefore, Orrick established what appeared to be a rigorous formula for determining whether an activity violated the treaty right. 83 The state appealed, and a divided Ninth Circuit panel affirmed but suggested that all the treaties required from the state were "reasonable steps" in light of its resources to preserve and enhance the fishery.
84
The tribes and the federal government sought and obtained en banc review, and a divided Ninth Circuit 85 decided that it was judicially imprudent to determine the habitat issue via a declaratory judgment without concrete facts. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit vacated the lower court's decision on this issue, 86 although it largely affirmed on the 82. Id. at 208 (citing Washington v. Commercial Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 686 (1979)) (specifying that the tribes' fifty percent share was a ceiling, not a floor, and that the treaties guaranteed the tribes "so much as but no more than is necessary to provide the Indians with a livelihood-that is to say, a moderate living."). See supra note 74 on the moderate living language.
83. Judge Orrick's formula presumed that until the tribes' share of the harvests was reduced to less than fifty percent, their "moderate living" needs were unmet. Until they were met, the state bore the burden of showing that any environmental degradation of the fish habitat proximately caused by the State's actions (including the authorization of third parties' activities) will not impair the tribes' ability to satisfy their moderate living needs. Naturally, the plaintiffs must shoulder the initial burden of proving that the challenged action(s) will proximately cause the fish habitat to be degraded such that the rearing or production potential of the fish will be impaired or the size or quality of the run will be diminished. hatchery question. 87 Thus, in 1985, the tribes stood in roughly the same position on the habitat issue as they did when they filed the case fifteen years before: with no clear indication whether the treaties protected the fish that were the essential bargain for the largely peaceful white settlement that followed their signing in the 1850s.
IV. THE CULVERTS CASE IN THE DISTRICT COURT
The tribes spent much of the ensuing decade-and-a-half pursuing other means of fish restoration, particularly efforts to rebuild salmon runs, such as through the Northwest Power and the Endangered Species Acts.
88 Some lower-court case law involving particular dams, pipelines, marinas, fish farms, and water rights suggested that the treaty right could restrain habitat-destructive actions, particularly those that blocked access to historic fishing sites. 89 But by the turn of the century, there was no definitive ruling on whether the treaties protected fish from environmental degradation of their habitat.
Between 1985 and 2001, the tribes searched for factual settings that would satisfy the Ninth Circuit's demand for concrete evidence on the habitat issue. They eventually arrived at road culverts constructed and maintained by the state, which was an auspicious choice because the effect of poorly constructed or operated culverts is often quite dramatic: salmon migrating and spawning below the barrier culverts, but not at all above. 90 As a result, the tribes and the federal government filed a new 87. Id. at 1357-60 (finding the hatchery issue to be sufficiently particularized to be subject to judicial resolution, but determining that Judge Orrick improperly concluded that the tribal harvest share was a minimum share when in fact it was a maximum). 
A. The 2007 Decision
Six years later, after extensive briefing, 92 Judge Martinez handed down a decision granting the tribes' request for declaratory relief but deferring a determination on injunctive relief. 93 The Martinez Decision emphasized that the treaty fishing right was an essential part of the bargain that led to one of the largest peaceful real estate transactions in The problem of fish barrier culverts is more widespread than simply limiting the ability of adult salmon to return to spawning grounds. Movement is essential for thesuccessful life-cycle completion and persistence of populations of all animal species.Movement can be broken down into four categories: station keeping, ranging, migration,and accidental displacement, all of which Western salmonids express. Station keepingoccurs within an animal's home range and includes foraging, commuting and territorial behavior. Ranging occurs when animals leave their home range for a short time in orderto explore new habitat. Migrations occur when animals make regular, predictable longdistance movement. Accidental displacments are caused by unpredictable environmentaland human-caused events such as fire, flood, hurricane or habitat alteration and destructionby humans. The ability to move is crucial to every part of the salmonid cycle. Salmonids require a multitude of habitats for their life-cycles. They utlize different habitats for spawning, rearing and refuge, and each of these habitats must be connected. The problem is complicated by the fact that different salmonid specieshave different movement patterns and habitat requirements. However, regardlessof the type of salmonide population, they must be able to move in order for populations to persist. history, 94 concluding that the treaties required the state to refrain from building or operating road culverts that hinder fish passage. 95 Judge Martinez first determined that road culverts were responsible for "some portion of the diminishment" of the tribes' harvestable fish, even if the tribes could not provide an exact figure of the amount of fish taken by culverts. 96 Second, he denied that recognizing such a right imposed a broad environmental servitude or imposed an affirmative duty on the state to take all possible measures to protect tribal fisheries. 97 Third, he rejected the state's argument that the Supreme Court's "moderate living" standard was unenforceable and instead ruled the standard could be applied to barrier culverts with the aid of the treaty rules of construction. 98 For all of these reasons, Judge Martinez ruled that the treaties' reservation of the tribes' "right of taking fish" was more than merely an opportunity to fish.
99
Quoting extensively from the Supreme Court's affirmance of Judge Boldt's decision, 100 the court decided that the assurances by the United States' treaty negotiators that the tribes could continue their historical fishing practices "would only be meaningful if they carried the implied promise that neither the negotiators nor their successors would take actions that would significantly degrade the resource."
101 Thus, he determined that the treaty "right of taking fish" included a right of habitat protection which the state had violated through its construction and operation of road culverts blocking fish passage. 98. Id. at *5-6 (concluding that "'[m]oderate living' . . . is neither a 'missing term' in the contract, nor a meaningless provision; it is a measure created by the Court. To the extent that it needs definition, it would be for the Court, not the Tribes, to define it."). 
B. The 2013 Injunction
After a bench trial, and fruitless negotiations attempting to settle the case, Judge Martinez issued a decision on injunctive relief in 2013. 103 The court directed the state to identify, in consultation with the tribes and the federal government, all barrier culverts under state-owned roads using a prescribed methodology. 104 The court then ordered the state by October 2016 to fix 180 barrier culverts within the case area owned or managed by the state fish and wildlife, natural resources, and parks agencies, 105 which the state claimed it had planned to do anyway. For the more than 800 barrier culverts under the jurisdiction of the state transportation agency that blocked at least 200 meters of linear habitat, Judge Martinez gave the state seventeen years-or until 2030-to fix them. 106 But he also provided an exemption for up to ten percent of the transportation agency's culverts under certain conditions that included consultation with the tribes and the federal government and a physical survey of the habitat blocked by each culvert. 107 The state must also fix all remaining barrier culverts at the end of the culvert's usual life or in connection with a new highway project, whichever comes first.
108
The injunction also authorized the state to deviate from prescribed passage standards "in rare circumstances" on emergency grounds and under extraordinary conditions, 109 and established monitoring conditions to ensure that fixed barrier culverts continue to supply requisite fish passage. 110 The state must provide notice to the tribes of any changes in its culverts inventory, including the identification of previously unidentified barrier culverts, so the tribes can monitor state implementation of the injunction. 111 Finally, and importantly, the court retained continuing jurisdiction "for a sufficient period" to oversee state 
A. Affirming the Treaty Right to Habitat Protection
At the outset, Judge William Fletcher, who had incredulously questioned the state's suggestion at oral argument that it could destroy all the salmon runs, 115 dismissed the state's argument that the Stevens Treaties promised the tribes only half of the available harvest, not that "any fish will, in fact, be available." 116 The court specifically rejected the state's contention that the main purpose of the treaties was to open the region to white settlement, explaining that the state failed to interpret the treaties as the tribes would understand, and the Indian understanding was that treaties would provide a means of supporting themselves through continued salmon harvests.
117 Salmon were-in the words of the 1905 Supreme Court-"not much less necessary to the existence of the [tribes] than the atmosphere they breathed." 118 Judge Fletcher emphasized that the tribes did not understand the treaties to allow the government "to diminish or destroy the fish runs"; interpreting the 122 The former applied reserved rights to water, because a tribal land reservation's purpose-to make the tribes "pastoral and civilized" 123 -could not be achieved without an implied right of water for irrigation. 124 The latter inferred a water right for the Klamath Tribe's reservation to sustain treaty-reserved hunting and fishing rights in Klamath Marsh. 125 Relying on the Supreme Court's decision affirming Judge Boldt, the Ninth Circuit stated that "even in the absence of explicit promise, we would infer a promise that the number of fish would always be sufficient to provide a 'moderate living' to the Tribes."
126
The court also used the rules of treaty interpretation to reject the state's allegation that the federal government's actions and inactions over the years led the state to believe the government had waived its 120. Washington, 827 F.3d at 852 ("Even if Governor Stevens had not explicitly promised that 'this paper secures your fish,' and that there would be food 'forever,' we would infer such a promise."). 130 as support for its claim that the equitable doctrines of laches or estoppel prevented the federal government from asserting the treaty right also proved unavailing. Judge Fletcher distinguished Sherrill on the ground that the Oneida tribe had abandoned its land and let its aboriginal rights claim fall dormant; the Stevens' Treaty tribes had done neither-in fact, they had been contesting in court state actions affecting their fishing rights for over a century. 131 Moreover, the court reaffirmed its rule that neither laches, nor estoppel, nor waiver may defeat Indian treaty rights.
132
The state also failed to convince the court that the federal government had an obligation to fix its own road culverts before suing the state. The state argued that the district court's injunction requiring it to fix offending barrier culverts was unfair and imposed a disproportionate burden on the state. 133 But the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court on both sovereign immunity and standing grounds. On the former, the court ruled that sovereign immunity protected the federal government from affirmative relief in the absence of its consent. 134 On the latter, in the process of rejecting the state's standing, the court clarified that the federal government's culverts did in fact violate the treaties, no less than the state's culverts did. 135 The court concluded, however, that the state lacked standing to enforce the treaty right of the tribes which, Judge Fletcher noted, had "not sought redress against the United States in the proceeding now before us."
136
If there were no right to protect the environment necessary to preserve fish habitat, the Ninth Circuit thought that the state could impermissibly "crowd the Indians out of any meaningful use of their accustomed places to fish," something the Supreme Court had proscribed. 137 In effect, the tribes' "in common" treaty right was a tribal property right that protected them from being "crowded out" of their historic fisheries and preempted contrary state action.
138

B. Affirming the Martinez Injunction
The state's best chance to change the Martinez Decision was probably to challenge the scope of the injunction the court ordered: (1) requiring the state to fix barrier culverts that it had already committed to fix; (2) prescribing a seventeen-year period for fixing the majority of barrier culverts; but (3) also providing an exemption for ten percent of the priority culverts; and (4) not requiring the state to fix non-priority culverts until the end of their life, or when there was a new roadway project. 139 But because the state thought the injunction was unjustified, it 135 . Id. at 856 ("Our holding that Washington has violated the Treaties in building and maintaining its barrier culverts violated the Treaties necessarily means that the United States has also violated the Treaties in building and maintaining its own barrier culverts.").
Id.
Id. at 852 (emphasis in original) (quoting Washington v. Commercial Passenger Fishing
Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 676-77 (1979)) ("Governor Stevens and his associates were well aware of the 'sense' in which the Indians were likely to view assurances regarding their fishing rights. During the negotiations, the vital importance of the fish to the Indians was repeatedly emphasized by both sides, and the Governor's promises that the treaties would protect that source of food and commerce were crucial in obtaining the Indians' assent. It is absolutely clear, as Governor Stevens himself said, that neither he nor the Indians intended that the latter should be excluded from their ancient fisheries, and it is accordingly inconceivable that either party deliberately agreed to authorize future settlers to crowd the Indians out of any meaningful use of their accustomed places to fish.") (emphasis in original). refused to participate in negotiating its terms. 140 This strategy turned out to be a colossal mistake, as neither the district court nor the Ninth Circuit gave deference to the state's position concerning how to implement the treaty fishing right.
141
After reviewing the evidence before the lower court, 142 the Ninth Circuit rejected the state's claims that there was no evidence in the record that state-owned culverts had a significant effect on salmon production, citing the state's own studies contradicting this allegation.
143
In fact, the court concluded that the state studies had underestimated the effect of fixing deficient barrier culverts, finding a habitat capability of producing "several times the 200,000 mature salmon" specified in a 1997 state report that referred to barrier culverts as "one of the most recurrent and correctible obstacles" to restoring healthy salmon runs.
144
The court also relied heavily on tribal experts-as well as the state'sconcerning the importance of fixing culverts that block salmon migration, and thus rejected the state's claim that the lower court had no evidence to support its injunction.
145
The Ninth Circuit dismissed the state's contention concerning the overbreadth of the district court's injunction. The court took particular issue with the state's claim that the injunction "indiscriminately orders correction of . . . every . . . barrier culvert" in the case area, because the district court's order in fact had "carefully distinguishe[d] between highand low-priority culverts based on the amount of upstream habitat culvert correction will open up." 146 The lower court also authorized an exemption for up to ten percent of high-priority culverts to be fixed on the "more lenient" schedule for low-priority culverts.
147
In addition, the court rejected the state's estimates of the cost of implementing the injunction, finding them to be "not supported by the evidence" and citing studies showing the state-claimed costs to be considerable overestimates. 148 Nor did the state account for the fact that federal funding would cover a considerable amount of the cost of correcting offending barrier culverts. 149 Thus, the state's allegation that the injunction would cost "roughly $100 million per year" and result in "deep and painful cuts to subsidized health insurance for low income workers, K-12 schools, higher education, and basic aid for persons unable to work" was, the court thought, "dramatically overstated." 150 The court observed that the state had a separate transportation budget of $9.9 billion during the 2011-13 biennium, 151 Id. at 864 (quoting the district court's decision). Even using the state's inflated cost figures, $100 million annually for culvert repairs would amount to roughly just two percent of the state's $9.9 billion transportation budget during the 2013-15 biennium.
153. Id. at 864 (claiming that an injunction should: (1) be no broader than necessary to cure a federal law violation; (2) grant deference to a state's institutional competency and subject matter expertise; (3) not substitute a court's budgetary judgment for that of the state's; and (4) be the least intrusive relief in terms of interfering with a state's governmental affairs). In terms of the potential implications of the Ninth Circuit's affirmation of the Martinez Injunction, perhaps the easiest extrapolation concerns other road culverts. In response to the state's argument that the lower court's injunction was unfair because it required the state to fix its faulty culverts before the federal government had to do so, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court on both sovereign-immunity and standing grounds. 156 Although the court specifically found that the federal government had also violated the treaty fishing right with its culverts, 157 it rejected the state's claim because "any violation of the Treaties by the United States violates rights held by the Tribes" and they The state maintained that the panel decision gave "the district court unprecedented power to make policy in Washington," fixing a problem caused by the federal government, which had approved the design of virtually all the culverts at issue. Id. at 3-4. The state also alleged that the effect of the panel decision's recognition of a habitat protection right was to impermissibly guarantee to the tribes a minimum quantity of fish. Id. at 9. Although the state conceded in its briefing to the panel that "the treaties protect against habitat protection that discriminates against tribal fishing," it claimed that the injunction affirmed by the panel was overbroad, imprecise, uncertain, and inconsistent with the 1985 en banc decision, requesting a rehearing "to articulate the treaty obligation most precisely than the panel did." Id. at 10. The state suggested that a more appropriate and workable injunction would target only those culverts that "prevent meaningful use of a usual and accustomed tribal fishing ground that would be otherwise useable," because the injunction the panel upheld "requires the State to replace culverts even when doing so will make no difference," as "roughly 90% of state barrier culverts are upstream or downstream of other barriers." Id. at 11, 15-16. In addition, the state attempted to resurrect the 1982 panel decision's litmus of "reasonable steps commensurate with" the state's resources, id. at 11, but that standard was vacated by the 1985 en banc panel, see supra note 86. Finally, the state contended that panel erroneously rejected its argument that it should be able to recoup some of the costs of replacing culverts from the federal government for culverts that it designed, funded or authorized. Id. at 12-13.
Idaho and Montana submitted an amicus brief supporting Washington's rehearing petition, alleging that the panel decision was inconsistent with the case law implying rights in Indian treaties where "absolutely necessary" or where the purposes of a reservation would be "defeated," neither of which obtained in the culverts case. "have not sought redress against the United States" in the case before us. 158 Thus, the Ninth Circuit seemed to suggest that the tribes could successfully sue the federal government, obtaining similar relief. But there would be significant impediments to proceeding against the federal government.
159 Moreover, rather than filing suit, the tribes may wish to file a rulemaking petition with federal agencies requesting a schedule for fixing the federal culverts, mostly on national forests, in order to maintain relations with its trustee in other cases involving other habitatdamaging activities. 160 On the other hand, culverts built and maintained by local governments do not seem to be expressly subject to the district court's injunction. 161 Thus, that loophole could prompt a separate suit by the tribes, although there is a strong argument that local governments-as mere "creatures" of the state-are subject to the state's obligations. In addition to barrier culverts, dams also impede salmon migration. Many dams provide fish passage but hardly any are operated to maximize salmon survival. Some dams-like the federal dams on the lower Snake River-destroy salmon habitat and hamper migration while providing minimal public benefits compared with their public costs. 167 governmental processes . . . and school boards, as creatures of the State, obviously must give effect to policies announced by the state legislature.") (internal citations omitted).
163. See Martinez Injunction, 2013 WL 1334381, at *6 ("Washington State law has long required that obstructions across or in its streams be provided with a durable and efficient fishway, maintained in an effective condition and continuously supplied with sufficient water to freely pass fish."). 174 Similarly, timber harvests, grazing practices, and construction projects can produce sedimentation in salmon streams in violation of water quality standards. 175 Although water quality standards violations might not be as dramatic an interference with salmon migration and habitat as road culverts and dams, they remain significant obstacles to salmon restoration. 176 Moreover, to the extent that any federal land usage triggers evaluations required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), it would seem that among the reasonable alternatives that a federal agency must consider to comply with NEPA would be one protecting treaty fishing rights. 177 Further, it may be that the agency would have no choice but to select the alternative that protects the right of taking fish, since administrative agencies have no authority to terminate or curtail treaty rights. 178 Because any of the above-described actions may be subject to treatyimposed limits does not necessarily mean that all culverts, dams, diversions, and land-use practices will be subject to treaty constraints. 179 Applying treaty rights to particular activities will be a factual decision that, under the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, will first consider whether there is an affirmative action adversely affecting fish subject to the treaties. 180 Second, the action must proximately cause significant damage; 181 de minimis harms do not apparently violate the treaties.
164
182
These fact-based considerations will invite trial courts to make case-bycase decisions. 183 They closely resemble the language used by Judge Orrick without the express burden shifting he prescribed. 184 In application, there might not be much of a difference from the Orrick formula announced in 1980.
185 If so, the tribes will have lost thirty-six years of enforcement but not the fundamental right to protect the fish that was the tribes' principal concern in negotiating the treaties of the 1850s. Although widespread disruption of state and local economies are unlikely, all non-tribal entities should now feel prodded to improve salmon habitat-harming processes of their activities.
186
CONCLUSION
The rules of interpretation concerning Indian treaties 187 were crucial to the decisions of Judge Martinez and the Ninth Circuit, both of which emphasized the Indian understanding of the treaties they signed in the 1850s. 188 The resort to such foundational interpretative principles echoed some recent United States Supreme Court decisions. 189 But the promises made to the tribes in the Stevens Treaties 160 years ago-the right of taking fish in common with the settlers at usual fishing places-were express, not implied. 190 And this express promise had been construed, largely favorably to the tribes, numerous times by the Supreme Court 185. Although the en banc Ninth Circuit vacated the Orrick Decision, it did so only on the ground of the imprudence of making treaty rights declarations in the absence of concrete facts. 1985 Washington, 759 F.2d at 1357.
186. One way to minimize conflicts between damaging developments and treaty rights would be to consult with the tribes in advance of considering the merits of such proposals. Under Executive Order 13,007, federal agencies must, "to the extent practicable, . . . avoid adversely affecting the physical integrity of [tribal] sacred sites." 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (1996) . Presumably, this directive requires some sort of consultation with affected tribes. However, it is not entirely clear that treaty fishing and other off-reservation usufructuary rights are sacred sites, and the executive order does not apply to states or to private actions not requiring federal approval, does not override other law or "essential agency functions" and does not create a cause of action. Id. at 26, 771-72. over the course of the twentieth century. 191 Both parties to the treatiesthe tribes and their federal trustee-urged the courts, in light of this substantial precedent, to construe the treaty language to include habitat protection for fish. The State of Washington, which was not in existence in the 1850s, not only was not party to the treaty negotiations but had a long and reprehensible history of discriminating against the treaty fishing right. 192 
A. The State's Failed Efforts to Resist the Treaty Right
The state's arguments were all met with judicial dubiety. For example, the state argued that restoring salmon passage at state-owned culverts was not the only or best way to fix the salmon problem.
193 Even if this contention contained an element of truth, the allegation was ultimately irrelevant because the issue was whether state-owned and operated road culverts significantly damaged the tribes' fishing rights. Moreover, promises of "comprehensive" salmon restoration have, over the past three decades, produced very little restoration, at least in terms of spawning fish, 194 despite large-scale public expenditures.
195
The state did have a plan to restore fish passage at barrier culverts, but fully implementing it would not be achieved, in the district judge's estimation, for at least 100 years, 196 if ever. 197 Identified barrier culverts actually increased from 2009 to 2011. 198 And state assertions about the costs of implementing the district court's injunction met with deep judicial skepticism and were ultimately rejected. 199 The state's legal strategy failed as well. Its principal mistake was abstaining from negotiations over the scope of the injunction during the six years the state denied the validity of the district court's decision. 200 The upshot was that both Judge Martinez and the Ninth Circuit accepted the injunction proffered by the tribes and their trustee, 201 and the state likely forfeited an opportunity to urge more flexible implementation. 202 
B. The Federal Role in Protecting the Treaty Right
The federal trustee's role in the case was remarkable. The trustee never wavered as the nearly half-century-old litigation proceeded from securing a harvest share, including hatchery fish in that share, and implying a right of habitat protection. The federal trustee has not always been so steadfast in pursuing the interest of the tribes. 203 This resoluteness was all the more surprising in this case, given the federal government's ownership of road culverts that violated the treaty right as much as the state's. 204 The state tried to make something of the federal government's compromised position, arguing that it was unfair to make the state fix its culverts while overlooking the federal culverts, 205 but the Ninth Circuit ruled, on sovereign-immunity and standing grounds, that the state had no viable claim, since the treaty right was the tribes' to assert. 206 The tribes may decide to proceed against the federal government in the future but, as suggested above, 207 they may choose to not to do so if the federal government applies this legal standard to all of its activities as a matter of course.
But the federal role in adversely affecting salmon migration and habitat is considerable, particularly in the Columbia Basin, where federal dams predominate. A recent district court decision found, for the fourth time, that the federal plan of annual hydroelectric operations violated the Endangered Species Act. 208 Quite possibly, the operation of these dams also violates treaty fishing rights. In retrospect, it now seems quite apparent that the approval of federal dams that blocked salmon migration entirely-like the Grand Coulee and Chief Joseph dams-also violated the treaties. 209 
C. The Road Ahead
Less clear treaty right violations concern federal land management decisions like timber sales and grazing permits that produce sedimentation, temperature increases, and loss of riparian habitat that damage fish runs, as the significance of the damage may be subject to dispute. But federal land managers will no doubt hear from tribes that monitor and comment on federal actions that affect their treaty fishing. There is some evidence that the managers-even state agencies-are listening.
In 2015, the Oregon agency with regulatory authority over state lands denied a permit for a marina that would have hosted a large coal transport facility on the Columbia River, citing treaty fishing concerns. 210 And in 2016, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers denied a permit for the largest coal port in North American on grounds of interfering with the Lummi Tribe's treaty rights. 211 These decisions could auger poorly for several proposed oil port terminals with treaty rights' effects. 212 The Ninth Circuit's decision affirming Judge Martinez's injunction vindicates those decisions by making clear that regulatory agencies cannot approve developments that block access to treaty fishing sites or diminish the availability of harvestable fish. 213 The prospects of projects that would significantly and adversely affect treaty fishing rights is especially questionable given the fact that resource developers cannot defend on the basis of the reasonableness of their proposals, claiming that the social utility of their actions outweighs the gravity of the harm inflicted. 214 A reasonableness defense was once articulated by a Ninth Circuit panel but later vacated, 215 and the 2016 decision did not revive it. The result justifies the tribes' and their federal trustee's long and winding litigation road, begun nearly a half-century ago.
In a larger sense, however, the culverts case may not signal that all tribes may use their treaties to block developments of which they oppose. For one thing, not all treaties include off-reservation property rights. For another, the federal trustee may not support the tribes-and may, in fact, be permitting the development. 216 These complications may distinguish the culverts decision and limit its precedential reach. But the significance of the case for salmon restoration not only in the case area of the Puget Sound basin but throughout the Pacific Northwest should not be underestimated. 217 It is not an overstatement to suggest that the decision is the Stevens Treaty tribes' most significant victory since the Supreme Court's affirmation of Judge Boldt in 1979. 
